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Determinants of IPO Underpricing:
Tech vs Non-Tech Industries
Jordan Beck *
ABSTRACT. Do firms in the tech industry experience higher levels of underpricing when
going public as opposed to firms not in the tech industry? This research uses a linear
regression model to analyze the determinants of underpricing in the initial public offering
market. The model indicates that underpricing is influenced by the offer price, underwriter
quality, and the size of the firm as a measure of risk. This analysis does not find evidence
of higher levels of underpricing in the tech industry. Further research could analyze the
levels of underpricing over time as an industry matures.

“Go out on a limb. That’s where the fruit is.” – Jimmy Carter

I. Introduction
Between 1990 and 1998, companies lift $27 billion of potential capital on
the table by underpricing initial public offerings (Loughran and Ritter
2002, 413). The same companies, combined, generated $8 billion in
profits in the year leading up to their initial public offering, which means
the money left on the table represents more than three years of aggregate
profits (Loughran and Ritter 2002, 413). In the year 2000, during the
internet stock bubble, companies left $27 billion on the table in their initial
public offerings and 77 initial public offerings doubled in price on their
first day of trading (Ritter 2016). Underpricing is still present as Snap
Inc.’s stock price rose 44 percent on its first day in public markets.
The internet stock bubble and the recent initial public offering from
Snap Inc. sparked a question about underpricing: do firms in the tech
industry experience higher levels of underpricing compared to firms not
in the tech industry? This study does not find statistically significant
evidence supporting the theory of higher underpricing in the tech industry.

*I would like to extend a special thanks to Dr. Adam Smedema and Dr. Imam Alam for
their assistance with my research.
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II. Initial Public Offerings
An initial public offering (IPO) involves a private company ‘going public’
by selling stock for the first time. The stock trades in public markets after
its initial issue. Younger firms go public more often than older privately
held firms. There are many advantages and disadvantages of going public.
A. ADVANTAGES
An initial public offering increases the liquidity of the firm. Owners of
private firms may have difficulties finding buyers of stock and setting a
price for the transaction. Initial public offerings allow the founders of the
company to diversify their own portfolios by selling a fraction of their
stock to the public and moving their wealth to other investments.
Initial public offerings open doors for firms to raise additional capital.
If a private firm needs to raise cash it has two options. The firm can go to
the existing owners, who may not have the money or desire to put more
money into the firm. The firm could also go to external wealthy investors.
The wealthy investors may not want to put money into the firm unless they
have voting control, which requires ownership of more than 50% of the
firm (Brigham and Daves 2016, 698). After going public, firms are
regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and must publicly
disclose specific information, which makes investors more willing to
invest in the firm and so makes it easier to access capital.
The promise of initial public offerings gives firms the opportunity to
provide incentives to employees. The incentives can be stock ownership
or options on stock, which may increase the productivity of employees
(Brigham and Daves 2016, 698). Initial public offerings set market prices
for the firms. When firms acquire or merge with other companies, the
market price helps facilitate the price negotiations. Initial public offerings
can also help firms sell their products and services after going public. The
firms become better known, which opens new potential markets.
B. DISADVANTAGES
Initial public offerings increase reporting costs for firms. A public
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company must file quarterly and annual reports with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which drives up reporting costs. It can also be
costly for firms to remain in compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Initial public offerings also increase the time spent with investor relations
because investors want to know what the firm is doing. This requires
Chief Financial Officers to spend an estimated two days per week
speaking with investors and analysts (Brigham and Daves 2016, 699). The
use of executives’ time presents a large opportunity cost as executives
could spend their time creating value for the firm.
The increased reporting activities increase the transparency of the firm
and its owners. Although transparency is a positive for investors,
transparency has the potential to be a disadvantage to the issuing firm
because competitors can see the reported operating data, which can be
used to imitate the firm’s activities.
Initial public offerings reduce the owners’ or managers’ control.
Managers without voting control may feel obligated to show short-term
earnings gains to please the shareholders (Brigham and Daves 2016, 699).
This strategy may not be in the shareholders’ best long-term interests.
Firms must weigh the advantages against the disadvantages to decide
whether they should issue an initial public offering.

III. The Process of Going Public
Issuing an initial public offering is complicated, expensive, and timeconsuming. First, a firm must find an underwriter by interviewing
multiple investment banks and discussing issue strategies. Initial public
offerings are commonly underwritten. When an underwriter underwrites
the issue, the issuing firm receives a guarantee for the sale of their
securities. The underwriter agrees to buy the entire issue and then resell
the issue to investors. Underwriters sometimes form underwriting
syndicates, a group of underwriters to help handle the issue, to spread out
the risk involved with distributing the issue (Brigham and Daves 2016,
700).
As previously mentioned, regulation is one key factor to consider
when private companies go public. An issuing firm must be registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission at least 20 days before the
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issue. Issuing firms must submit a registration statement called the Form
S-1, which contains financial, legal, and technical information about the
issuing firm and is summarized in the prospectus for investors (Brigham
and Daves 2016, 701). If there is inadequate information, the Securities
and Exchange Commission can delay or stop the initial public offering.
The preliminary prospectus, called the ‘red herring’, must be provided
during any sales solicitation. If there is misrepresentations or omissions
of material facts in the registration statement or prospectus, investors who
suffer a loss may sue for damages (Brigham and Daves 2016, 702).
After the registration statement has been filed, the issuing firm goes
on a roadshow. The issuing firm’s senior management, underwriter, and
lawyers travel to major financial centers throughout the United States to
present potential institutional investors with the information in the
registration statement and prospectus. Investors express their interest by
indicating how many shares the investor is interested in buying. The
underwriter records the number of shares each investor is willing to buy
at a specified price. This process is referred to as book building. Book
building provides information for the demand for the initial public
offering. If demand is high and the initial public offering is
oversubscribed, the underwriter may increase the offering price. The
underwriter may lower the offering price if demand is too low. The
issuing firm submits the final amended registration statement and
prospectus the day before the trading of the initial public offering, which
includes the number of shares to be sold and the offering price. If the
Securities and Exchange Commission approves, the initial public offering
will begin trading the next day (Brigham and Daves 2016).

IV. Underpricing
Ljungqvist (2004) defines underpricing as “the percentage difference
between the price at which the IPO shares were sold to investors (the offer
price) and the price at which the shares subsequently trade in the market”
(381). Evidence of underpricing is clear relatively quickly in welldeveloped capital markets and is typically apparent after the first day of
trading.
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Underpricing = (First day closing price – Offer price) / Offer price
Levels of underpricing can also be calculated with the dollar amount of
‘money left on the table’. Ljungqvist (2004) defines money left on the
table as “the difference between the aftermarket trading price and the offer
price, multiplied by the number of shares sold at the IPO” (381). This
measure assumes that the issuing firm would be able to sell the issued
shares at the aftermarket-trading price as opposed to the offer price. The
firm has foregone that amount of money by selling at the offer price.
Money left on the table = (First day closing price – Offer price)
*Shares issued
Ritter (2016) presented Figure 1 to show the levels of underpricing
from 1990 to 2015. The graph shows the aggregate money left on the table
by issuing firms and the average first day return for the initial public
offerings for each year.
Figure 1
Source: Ritter (2016) https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files

The average first day return is between 10% and 20% for the majority of
the 25-year span. There is a spike when the average return jumps to 70%
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and 60% in 1999 and 2000. This time period was known as the internet
stock bubble. The graph also shows that the aggregate money left on the
table tracks the average first day return relatively well and helps one
visualize the extent of underpricing throughout time.

V. Literature Review
Underpricing in the market for initial public offerings has been thoroughly
researched since the 1980’s. Determinants of underpricing with initial
public offerings have been a great mystery as researchers have provided
various theories to help explain the levels of underpricing. Ljungqvist
(2004) grouped some of the most influential theories into four main
categories: asymmetric information, institutional explanations, ownership
and control reasons, and behavioral approaches. These theories help
explain parts of underpricing. There is, however, no theory that
completely explains underpricing on its own. This paper will use the same
four categories to organize the underpricing theories and discuss a
potential addition to the explanation of underpricing with regards to the
issuing firm’s industry.

VI. Asymmetric Information
As previously discussed, there are three parties in an initial public
offering: the issuing firm, the underwriter, and the investors. When
information is not distributed evenly among the three parties, there is
asymmetric information. One party may be better or worse off depending
on how informed they are relative to the other two parties.
A. THE WINNER’S CURSE
One of the best-known asymmetric information models is Rock’s (1986)
winner’s curse. Rock’s study was an extension of Akerlof’s (1970)
lemons problem. Rock studied the asymmetric information among the
investors of initial public offerings. This study split the investors in two
groups consisting of informed investors and uninformed investors with
regards to future prospects of issuing firms. The informed investors are
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only willing to invest in initial public offerings that they see attractively
priced. When issues are overpriced, only the uninformed investors will
buy into the issue. This leaves the uninformed investors losing out to the
informed investors over time. If the expected returns for uninformed
investors are negative, the uninformed investors will drop out of the
market. Rock (1986) assumes the issuing firm relies on capital from both
informed and uninformed investors; thus, the issues are underpriced to
provide a positive return and keep the informed investors in the market for
initial public offerings.
B. SIGNALING THEORY
Past research indicates that issuing firms may underprice their initial
public offering to signal the firm’s future prospects. Ibbotson (1975) said
that issuing firms underprice their initial public offering to “leave a good
taste in investors’ mouths”. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) have contributed
a theory that aligns with Ibbotson’s statement. Allen and Faulhaber (1989)
assume that the issuing firm possesses the best information about its future
prospects. Investors realize a larger initial return with the underpricing,
signaling positive future prospects for the firm. This allows the firm to
offer a seasoned equity offering, the issuance of additional shares of a
public company, at a higher price. The higher proceeds from the seasoned
equity offering may recoup the money that was foregone by underpricing
the initial public offering. Low-quality firms refrain from signaling with
underpricing, as they will not be able to recoup the money by charging a
higher price in a seasoned equity offering.
C. MARKET FEEDBACK HYPOTHESIS
The market feedback hypothesis assumes that institutional investors hold
better information on issuing firms. Underwriters and issuing firms would
like to get a hold of the institutional investors’ information during the
book-building process. Ritter (1998) states that the issuing firm and
underwriter must provide an incentive for the institutional investors to give
up this information. Incentives are provided through the underpricing of
the initial public offering. Ritter (1998) also states that underwriters can
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underprice the initial public offering to get potential investors to buy the
stock. Other investors will see the demand for the stock, resulting in more
stock being purchased with the bandwagon effect.
D. PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
Underwriters are held responsible for much of the activity in the bookbuilding and price-setting process. Agency problems may arise between
the underwriter and the issuing firm. Ljungqvist (2004) says that
underpricing represents a wealth transfer from the issuing firm to
investors, which can lead to rent-seeking behavior. Investors are
competing for allocations of the initial public offering and may offer sidepayments to the underwriter in the form of excessive trade commissions.
Underwriters may also allocate underpriced stock to institutional investors
in the hope they will gain future business from them. The practice of
allocating stock is referred to as ‘spinning’ (Loughran and Ritter 2004).
Both deliberately underprice initial public offerings.

VII. Institutional Explanations
A. LEGAL LIABILITY
As previously mentioned, misrepresented or omitted information from
registration and prospectus statements can lead to litigation. Investors can
sue for damages if they suffer a loss from the purchase of a firm’s initial
public offering, given the misrepresented or omitted information. Lowry
and Shu (2002) argue that deliberate underpricing acts as an insurance
policy against securities litigation. Underpricing lowers the probability of
being sued and decreases the plaintiffs’ potential recoverable damages if
sued. Their study finds evidence to support the insurance and deterrence
aspects of the litigation-risk hypothesis.

VIII. Ownership and Control
In private companies, the same people possess ownership and control
responsibilities, but by going public, the firm separates these two
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functions. The shareholders will own the firm while the managers will
make the operating and investment decisions that could lead to agency
costs (Ljungqvist 2004). There are two opposing arguments on the issue
of agency costs, retaining control, and reducing agency costs.
A. RETAINING CONTROL
Brennan and Franks (1997) argue that underpricing is associated with
oversubscription of the initial public offering. Firms then ration and
discriminate in the allocation of shares. The firms prefer smaller
allocations of shares spread throughout many investors. If managers
pursue non-value-maximizing behavior, there is less chance of receiving
scrutiny from large shareholders. Also, managers have less of a chance of
being driven out by a hostile takeover.
B. REDUCING AGENCY COSTS
The argument of Stoughton and Zechner (1998) takes an opposing view
from Brennan and Franks (1997). Stoughton and Zechner (1998) argue
that it may add value to allocate large portions of stock to large investors.
Large institutions can easily monitor the issuing firm and reduce agency
costs. If shares are allocated to many smaller institutions, there is less
monitoring of the issuing firm, thus leading to more agency costs. By
allocating shares to a larger institution, smaller institutions can take
advantage of their monitoring services as free riders.

IX. Behavioral Approaches
A. INVESTOR SENTIMENT
Behavioral finance is interested in the effect on stock prices of ‘irrational’
or ‘sentiment’ investors (Ljungqvist 2004). Assuming investors have a
positive attitude towards a firm’s future, the firm wants to capitalize on
that optimism. The firm does not want to flood the market with shares
because it would drive the price down. Instead, the firm wants to restrict
the supply of the shares. Since there are regulations against doing this
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directly, the issuing firm relies on institutional investors to hold back and
not sell their shares for a specified time period. The institutional investors
require the stock to be underpriced to take on the risk of holding back
shares.
B. PROSPECT THEORY
Issuing firms do not tend to get upset about leaving large amounts of
money on the table. Loughran and Ritter (2002) have looked further into
this puzzle. Prospect theory assumes that issuers put more weight on the
change in their wealth than on their level of wealth (Loughran and Ritter
2002). Prospect theory assumes the decision-makers’ initial valuations are
based on the initial price range in the registration statement. The offer
price routinely differs from this range. Decision makers are satisfied with
the underwriter’s performance if the perceived wealth gain exceeds the
cost of underpricing (Loughran and Ritter 2002).

X. Technology Firms
The theories previously mentioned have helped explain the underpricing
of initial public offerings across industries. The internet stock bubble
sparked interest into the effects that the industry has on a firm’s
underpricing.
Ritter (2016) defined tech stocks as “internet-related stocks plus other
technology stocks, not including biotech.” Examples of tech companies
include Facebook, Snap Inc., and Square. Facebook uses the internet as
a main component of business in its social media business model. Snap
Inc. uses the technology of cameras in its business model. Square uses
technology to provide credit card reading services. John Deere is an
example of a company not in the tech industry. Although there is
technology incorporated into John Deere’s agriculture equipment, the
technology is not its main line of business in their business model. Tech
companies actively use the internet and technology as a main component
of business in their business model.
Karlis (2008) found evidence that internet companies are more
underpriced relative to companies that do not use the internet as a main
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line of business. This may be explained by the additional risks associated
with internet companies because of their relatively young age and
difficulty in valuing the internet companies. The higher risk of
technology-related companies may accentuate the underpricing.
Bomans’s (2009) model explained underpricing with issue size, offer
price, underwriter quality, and industry. Offer price and industry were the
only two significant independent variables in the model. Bomans (2009)
found evidence to support the theory of higher levels of underpricing for
technology-related initial public offerings in Europe. My study aims to
provide insight to the underpricing associated with technology-related
initial public offerings in the United States.

XI. Model
My research attempts to explain the determinants of underpricing.
Specifically, my research tests if being involved in the tech industry
affects the level of underpricing in a firm’s initial public offering. My
model is based upon the model of Bomans (2009). I have, however,
modified the model due to data limitations. In order to explain the changes
in underpricing, I use underpricing as the dependent variable in the model.
The dependent variable can be interpreted as a percentage return on
the first day of trading. Underpricing is a function of offer price,
underwriter reputation, and industry. Equation [1] presents the final form
of my model. The expected sign is included on each coefficient and the
expected sign has been hypothesized based on past literature and the
relationship with underpricing. A positive coefficient indicates that an
increase in the independent variable increases the initial percentage return
and, therefore, the level of underpricing. A negative coefficient indicates
that an increase in the independent variable decreases the level of
underpricing.
Equation 1 – Final Model
UNDERPRICING = $0 – $1 (PRICE) – $2 (UW) +
$3 (LOGASSETS) – $4 (TECH) + g
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XII. Variables
UNDERPRICING is measured as the percentage return on the first day that
a stock is publicly traded. In this analysis, the average initial return is 14.2
percent, which is much larger than the daily return of the stock market. If
only we could all get our hands on initial public offerings. There is,
however, some risk involved with initial public offerings, as there is a
wide range of returns. UNDERPRICING will be the dependent variable
in this analysis.
PRICE is an independent variable in this analysis. The offer price of
the issue is a very important aspect of the stock’s return. The offer price
is predicted to have a negative relationship with the level of underpricing
because a higher offer price will result in a lower percentage return on the
first day of trading, all else equal. Also, a lower offer price will leave
more room for underpricing, therefore signaling positive future prospects
of the firm (Allen and Faulhaber 1989). Contrary to these theories, initial
public offerings may also be influenced by herd behaviors in the financial
markets, which could drive the price up and increase the initial percentage
return. Ritter (1998) discussed the bandwagon effect with initial public
offerings, which may affect the PRICE variable.
UW is a dummy independent variable representing underwriter quality.
This analysis uses Bloomberg’s (2015) initial public offering underwriter
rankings, which are ranked by the number of initial public offerings they
have underwritten in a year. The independent variable carries a value of
1 if the initial public offering had a lead underwriter that was ranked in the
top 10 by Bloomberg. The independent variable carries a value of 0 if it
does not use a top 10 underwriter as identified by Bloomberg. Carter,
Dark, and Singh (1998) find that reputable underwriters are associated
with less short-run underpricing. Cliff and Denis (2004) find that issuers
are less likely to switch underwriters for future issues if the initial public
offering has greater underpricing (2893). Underwriters could underprice
the issue to have a higher chance of future business. Loughran and Ritter
(2004) find that top-tier underwriters are associated with higher levels of
underpricing. Following these studies, the UW coefficient is predicted to
have a positive relationship with the level of underpricing.
LOGASSETS is an independent variable representing the log of the
issuing firm’s total assets at the end of 2014. Past studies have used the
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initial public offering’s issue proceeds to measure the size of the firm.
Unable to get access to this data, I use the firm’s assets as a proxy for the
size of the firm. Using a firm’s assets is a common method in finance to
measure the size of the firm because this number cannot theoretically be
negative. I use the log of assets to capture the economies of scale. Beatty
and Ritter (1986) find evidence for higher levels of underpricing
associated with higher uncertainty about the firm’s future prospects.
Smaller firms are considered more risky than larger firms and are
predicted to have higher levels of underpricing. LOGASSETS, as a
measure of size and therefore risk is expected to have a negative
relationship with underpricing.
TECH is a dummy independent variable representing a firm’s industry.
The independent variable will carry a value of 1 if the initial public
offering’s firm belongs to the tech industry and carry a value of 0
otherwise. Tech stocks are defined as those with Standard Industrial
Classification codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 3669,
3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827,
3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378,
and 7379 (Loughran and Ritter 2004). Ritter (2016) added Standard
Industrial Classification codes 3559, 3576, and 7389. The technology
industry is extremely volatile. Technology firms are typically younger
firms when they go public and are much harder to value. Hence
technology firms are more risky than non-tech firms. Consequently,
investors require higher returns for higher risk, therefore increasing the
level of underpricing. For these reasons, the TECH variable is predicted
to have a positive coefficient.

XIII. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data for this study were compiled from The Center for Research in
Securities Prices, IPO Scoop, and Nasdaq. The Center for Research in
Securities Prices is a database collected and compiled by The University
of Chicago Booth School of Business. IPO Scoop is an independent
research firm for initial public offerings. Nasdaq’s website holds financial
information for all companies currently trading in the public market. The
data set includes financial information for 136 initial public offerings in
2015 after excluding those with an offer price below $5.00 per share, Real
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Estate Investment Trusts, and firms not listed on The Center for Research
in Securities Prices. Descriptive statistics for each variable are presented
in Table 1.
TABLE 1 – Descriptive Statistics
N=136
Variable

Mean

UNDERPRICING 0.142
PRICE
15.113
UW
0.717
TECH
0.217
LOGASSETS
7.978

Standard
Deviation
0.290
5.228
0.452
0.414
0.973

Minimum

Maximum

-0.274
5.000
0
0
5.301

1.856
25.000
1
1
10.534

Expected
Sign
N/A
+
+
-

The average underpricing for an initial public offering was 14.2 percent in
2015. There is, however, a wide range for this variable. The minimum
amount of underpricing was -27.4 percent. This was the case when vTv
Therapeutics’ stock price fell by 27.4 percent in the first day of trading.
On the other end of the spectrum, Seres Therapeutics stock price jumped
185.6 percent on the first day of trading. This data shows the high
volatility and risk in the market for initial public offerings. The average
of the offer price in this data was $15.11 with a range from $5.00 to
$25.00. The averages of the two dummy variables represent the
percentage of the sample possessing the indicated characteristic. In this
data, 71.7% of the sample hired a top-tier underwriter as a lead
underwriter for their initial public offering. Also, 21.7% of the issuing
firms belonged to the tech industry. This sample provides an average log
of assets to be 7.978, which equates to roughly $94,960,462 in total assets.
Total assets have a wide range with a minimum of $200,000 in total assets
and a maximum of $34,269,300,000 in total assets.

XIV. Results and Discussion
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 2. The
analysis was performed on 136 initial public offerings in 2015. The
PRICE and UW independent variables are significant at the one-percent

Beck: Determinants of IPO Underpricing

53

level (p<.01). The LOGASSETS independent variable is significant at the
five-percent level (.01<p<.05) and the TECH independent variable is not
found to be statistically significant with this sample. The adjusted R2
equal to 0.1320 means that the model can explain about 13.2 percent of the
observed variation in the dependent variable. The F-statistic, a measure
of the overall fit of the model, is 5.04 and indicates that the model is
significantly different from the null model at the one-percent level.
Contrary to expectations, the positive coefficient on PRICE means that
a one-unit increase in the offer price will increase the level of underpricing
by 1.63 percent, all else equal. The positive coefficient supports the
findings of Bomans (2009). The initial expectation was that a higher offer
price would cause lower demand, therefore, reducing the amount of
underpricing, as investors don’t drive up the price. An explanation for the
positive coefficient may lie in Ritter’s (1998) bandwagon effect. When
looking at the book building process of initial public offerings, it is the
demand of the institutional investors that drives the decision of offer price.
If there is high institutional demand, the underwriter will set a higher offer
price. Once the public investors see the higher offer price due to high
demand from institutional investors, the public investors may follow the
institutional investors in demanding the newly issued stock. This
bandwagon effect causes higher demand for the stock, which drives the
stock price up on the first day leading to higher levels of underpricing.
TABLE 2 – Regression Results
Variable
Constant
PRICE
UW
TECH
LOGASSETS
N = 136

Coefficient
Robust S.E.
P-value
Bomans
0.3823
0.1809
0.037
0.1049
0.0163***
0.0052
0.002
0.0025***
0.1459**
0.0468
0.002
-0.0219
0.0278
0.0579
0.632
0.0582***
-0.0748**
0.0293
0.012
-0.0011
Adj. R2 = 0.1320 F = 5.04*** Prob>F = 0.0008 Adj. R2 = 0.0434
***Significant at 1%

**Significant at 5%

As hypothesized, the UW dummy variable carries a positive
coefficient. If a firm uses a high-quality underwriter, the firm can expect
higher levels of underpricing on the initial public offering by 14.59
percent. There has been extensive research on the underwriters’ effects on
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underpricing because of this considerable effect they can impose on initial
public offerings. My findings support the work of Cliff and Denis (2004)
as well as Loughran and Ritter (2004).
Consistent with expectations, LOGASSETS carries a negative
coefficient. A one-unit increase in the log of the firm’s total assets is
associated with a reduction in the level of underpricing by 7.48 percent.
Supporting the work of Beatty and Ritter (1986), larger firms are
associated with lower levels of underpricing because of the lower levels
of risk. Bomans (2009) measured the firm’s size as a measure of risk with
the issue proceeds from the initial public offering, which was not found to
be significant. The LOGASSETS variable better explains the level of
underpricing in this model.
TECH, my variable of interest, is not found to be significant. In my
findings, belonging to the tech industry does not statistically significantly
affect the level of underpricing. Bomans (2009) and Karlis (2008) used
data from the 1990’s and early 2000’s, the time of the internet stock
bubble. Karlis (2008) found evidence to support that more established
industries are not associated with higher levels of underpricing. By 2015,
the tech industry has matured and become more established and may no
longer be associated with higher levels of underpricing. We cannot,
however, rule it out based on these findings.

XV. Conclusion
Underpricing is measured with the percentage return on the stock in its
first day of public trading and can also be expressed as the amount of
money left on the table. Past literature has provided various theories to
explain underpricing that have been grouped into 4 categories; asymmetric
information, institutional explanations, ownership and control, and
behavioral approaches.
This study explored whether firms in the tech industry experience
higher levels of underpricing in initial public offerings than firms who are
not in the tech industry.
An OLS regression model was employed to analyze the underpricing
of initial public offerings in 2015. The coefficient for the tech industry
dummy variable was not found to be statistically significantly different
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from zero. This analysis does not find evidence for higher levels of
underpricing in the initial public offerings of firms in the tech industry.
The lack of evidence may be a result of the maturation of the tech
industry. Previous studies had examined the early years of the industry.
Future research could attempt to explain the levels of underpricing for less
mature industries. Future researchers could also attempt to find an
alternative to grouping industries and their levels of maturity.
References
Allen, F., and Faulhaber, G.R. 1989. “Signaling by underpricing in the IPO market.”
Journal of Financial Economics 23, 303-23.
Beatty, R.P., and Ritter, J.R. 1986. “Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing
of initial public offerings.” Journal of Financial Economics 15, 213-32.
Bomans, R.B. 2009. “IPO underpricing in Europe; a comparison between technology and
non-technology IPOs.” Retrieved from
http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=143696.
Brennan, M.J., and Franks, J. 1997. “Underpricing, ownership and control in initial
public offerings of equity securities in the U.K.” Journal of Financial Economics 45,
391-413.
Brigham, E.F., and Daves, P.R. 2016. Intermediate financial management. Boston, MA:
Cengage Learning.
Carter, R.B., Dark, F.H., Singh, A.K. 1998. “Underwriter reputation, initial returns, and
the long-run performance of IPO stocks.” The Journal of Finance 53, 285-311.
Cliff, M.T., and Denis, D.J. 2004. “Do initial public offering firms purchase analyst
coverage with underpricing?” The Journal of Finance 59, 2871-2901.
Ibbotson, R.G. 1975. “Price performance of common stock new issues.” Journal of
Financial Economics 2, 235-72.
Karlis, P.L. 2008. “IPO underpricing.” The Park Place Economist 8, 81-9.
Ljungqvist, A. 2004. Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance:
Chapter 7: IPO Underpricing. Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland.
Loughran, T., and Ritter, J.R. 2002. “Why don’t issuers get upset about leaving money
on the table in IPOs?” The Review of Financial Studies 15, 413-443.
Loughran, T., and Ritter, J.R. 2004. “Why has IPO underpricing increased over time?”
Financial Management 33, 5-37.
Lowry, M., and Shu, S. 2002. “Litigation risk and IPO underpricing.” Journal of
Financial Economics 65, 309-335.
Ritter, J.R. 1998. “Initial public offerings.” Contemporary Finance Digest 2, 5-30.
Ritter, J.R. 2016. “Initial public offerings: Technology stock IPOs.” Retrieved from
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/.
Rock, K. 1986. “Why new issues are underpriced.” Journal of Financial Economics 15,
187-212.
Stoughton, N.M., and Zechner, J. 1998. “IPO mechanisms, monitoring and ownership
structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 49, 45-78.

